Restaking.risk is a platform developed by A41 to assess slashing risks and incentive structures within Restaking-Secured Services (RSS). Restaking.risk proposes a standardized framework that classifies slashing mechanisms into three core types and evaluates them across four key categories.
Deterministic slashing mechanisms apply to violations that can be automatically verified through cryptographic proofs or on-chain data, such as signature violations or invalid proof submissions.
| Evaluation | Positive Criteria | Negative Criteria |
|---|---|---|
| Suitability | Designed to automatically slash based on clear, predefined violations | Applies to ambiguous or subjective violations |
| Enforcement | Conditions are deterministic and slashing is auto-executed | Requires manual judgment or DAO voting |
| Rewards | - | - |
| Transparency | Publicly verifiable through zk-proofs or on-chain logs | Data is off-chain or privately held |
Challenge-based mechanisms are useful for scenarios where real-time, automated detection is impractical—such as when operators delay data delivery intentionally or fail to attest during a time-sensitive window. These designs leverage third-party challengers to provide oversight, which helps decentralize enforcement and increases accountability. However, if the process lacks transparency, or if rewards are not aligned with the risk challengers take, this model can be gamed or ignored.
| Evaluation | Positive Criteria | Negative Criteria |
|---|---|---|
| Suitability | Suited for complex tasks and encourages decentralized validation | Applied unnecessarily to easily verifiable actions |
| Enforcement | Fair and clearly documented dispute process; includes test phase or audits | Lacks enforcement speed or has vague challenge periods |
| Rewards | Adequate rewards and penalties; prevents malicious economic behavior | Insufficient incentives or missing penalties |
| Transparency | Anyone can challenge; process is transparent and rules are well-documented | Rules unclear; challenge metrics not disclosed |
Committee-based mechanisms are used when off-chain context, community standards, or subjective evaluation is required. Here, a governance structure or DAO reviews potential violations and enforces slashing based on social consensus.
| Evaluation | Positive Criteria | Negative Criteria |
|---|---|---|
| Suitability | Suitable for context-sensitive or social rule enforcement | Misapplied to objectively verifiable violations |
| Enforcement | Clear definitions of roles, authority, and procedures | Overreaching governance or unclear processes |
| Rewards | Transparent, differentiated rewards for governance contributors | Poorly defined rewards, no penalties for misconduct, high participation cost vs low reward |
| Transparency | Anyone can challenge; process is transparent and rules are well-documented | Centralized governance, low participation (< 10%), or closed decision-making |
This framework enables more than just classification—it provides a risk-aware lens through which AVSs can be compared, staked on, or improved. By understanding not just whether slashing exists, but how it is structured and enforced, participants can make more secure, transparent, and sustainable decisions in the rapidly evolving restaking landscape.
The current evaluation criteria are designed as a foundational framework, but they may be further refined over time in response to external factors such as market maturity and the evolving complexity of the AVS ecosystem.
